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Background and objectives: Delusional beliefs with persecutory content are common in psychosis, but
difﬁcult to treat. Interventions targeting hypothesised causal and maintaining factors have been pro-
posed as a way of improving therapy. The current study is a feasibility randomised controlled trial of the
‘Thinking Well (TW)’ intervention: This novel approach combines the recently developed Maudsley
Review Training Programme (MRTP), with additional, focussed cognitive-behavioural therapy sessions.
Methods: 31 participants with distressing persecutory delusions and schizophrenia spectrum disorders
were randomised to TW or to treatment as usual in a 2:1 ratio. Participants completed outcome as-
sessments at 0 (baseline), 1 (post-MRTP), 6 (post-TW) and 8 (follow-up) weeks. Key outcomes included
belief ﬂexibility, paranoia, and delusional conviction and distress. Participants allocated to TW completed
the MRTP package and four CBT sessions with a clinical psychologist.
Results: Recruitment proved feasible. Participants reported the intervention was relevant and had
resulted in positive changes in thinking and mood, which they could use in everyday life. Treatment
effects were moderate-large for key outcomes including belief ﬂexibility, paranoia conviction and
distress. The additional TW sessions appeared to confer beneﬁts over MRTP alone.
Limitations: Assessments were not carried out blind to treatment condition. Recruitment was oppor-
tunistic, from an identiﬁed pool of research participants. Finally, a few participants had already
completed the MRTP as part of a previous study.
Conclusions: The TW intervention appears to be feasible and acceptable to participants, and the effects of
treatment are promising. A fully powered randomised controlled trial of the intervention is warranted.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
It was quite simple. I learnt to slow down and think carefully
about the situation. In the future I will be very hesitant about
coming to a ﬁxed conclusion. ‘Sandra’.e Institute of Psychiatry, Psy-
ing, De Crespigny Park, Lon-
4 (0)20 7848 5006.
.
r Ltd. This is an open access articlePsychosis is a heterogeneous condition, with a range of symp-
toms maintained by potentially different causal mechanisms. It has
consequently been argued that its treatment will be made more
effective by focussing on single symptoms and developing in-
terventions to target the mechanisms maintaining them (Freeman,
2011; Garety & Freeman, 2013).
Persecutory delusions are one of the most common psychotic
symptoms in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, present in 50% of
people so diagnosed (and over 70% at ﬁrst episode; Sartorius,
Jablensky, & Korten, 1986; Coid et al., 2013). They are highly dis-
tressing, often acted upon, and increase the risk of hospitalisationunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Existing treatments, whether pharmacological or psychological, are
limited in their effects and thus call for signiﬁcant improvement
(Freeman & Garety, 2014; Leucht et al., 2013; Turner, van der Gaag,
Karyotaki, & Cuijpers, 2014).
Reasoning biases are central to persecutory delusions: there is
robust evidence that such biases contribute to both development
andmaintenance of delusional beliefs (see Garety& Freeman, 2013,
for review). In particular, it has been proposed that limited belief
ﬂexibility and data gathering inﬂuence the appraisal of disturbing
anomalous experiences and adverse events, encouraging a rapid
acceptance of implausible ideas, without generating and consid-
ering alternative explanations (Garety et al., 2005). Reasoning is
therefore a promising intermediary target in treating persecutory
delusions. Accordingly, systematic attempts to modify reasoning
biases have begun to appear in the literature. Moritz and col-
leagues, in particular, have pioneered group-based metacognitive
training (MCT). This provides education and group exercises for
ameliorating a range of cognitive biases associated with psychosis,
including reasoning. A number of small trials have shown encour-
aging results for delusion change (see review, Moritz et al., 2014).
However, the two largest randomised controlled trials of MCT did
not show changes in reasoning or improvements in moderately
severe delusions (Moritz et al., 2013; van Oosterhout et al., 2014).
Especially for more severe delusions, individualised approaches
may be more effective in helping to engender belief ﬂexibility or
‘sow the seeds of doubt’ (Moritz et al., 2014). Building on the work
of Moritz and colleagues, we have developed a new individually-
delivered brief intervention that targets intensively the speciﬁc
reasoning mechanisms hypothesised to maintain persecutory
delusions.
Our initial work aimed ﬁrst to establish ‘proof-of-concept’
experimental evidence that targeting the hypothesised reasoning
mediators would induce change in paranoia and delusional
conviction. Our ﬁrst study tested the hypothesis that a brief inter-
vention speciﬁcally targeting the JTC reasoning bias would improve
delusions held with high conviction (Ross, Freeman, Dunn, &
Garety, 2011). In comparison to an attention control condition,
participants who completed the reasoning training showed a sig-
niﬁcant increase in data gathering on a reasoning task, and there
were small, albeit non-signiﬁcant, increases in belief ﬂexibility and
delusional conviction. We next embedded this intervention in the
Maudsley Review Training Programme (Waller, Freeman, Jolley,
Dunn, & Garety, 2011). This brief interactive computerised inter-
vention aims to provide education on reasoning biases (belief
inﬂexibility and jumping to conclusions), and then, in ﬁve tasks,
train participants to employ a number of strategies aimed at
identifying and reducing these biases. Three of the tasks include
materials designed to trigger paranoid thinking styles, in order to
elicit ‘hot cognitions’ and to teach strategies likely to generalise to
participants' own experiences and paranoid beliefs. We tried to
encourage participants to become more aware of their reasoning
processes, to help them to identify and, where appropriate, inhibit
rapid, automatic reasoning (‘type one’ reasoning), and to assist
their engagement in more analytical or controlled reasoning (‘type
two’) (Evans, 2008; Freeman, Lister,& Evans, 2014). Results from an
uncontrolled case series (n ¼ 13) with severe delusions were
promising, with signiﬁcant improvements in both reasoning and
delusions (Waller et al., 2011). Finally, we conducted a larger proof-
of-concept experiment in a group with high conviction and dis-
tressing delusions with paranoid content (N ¼ 101). Comparing the
Maudsley Review Training Programme with an attention control
condition in a randomised controlled design demonstrated signif-
icant improvements in both reasoning and persecutory delusions. It
also indicated that the improved outcomes for paranoia weremediated by changes in belief ﬂexibility; in particular the recog-
nition that one's judgements may sometimes be mistaken and that
alternative explanations might be available (Garety et al., 2014).
We therefore have proof-of-concept evidence that belief ﬂexi-
bility and data gathering can be improved in people with severe
delusions, and that changes in reasoning (in particular, belief ﬂex-
ibility) mediate improvement in delusions. However, a more
intensive therapeutic intervention using trained therapists is
needed to establish longer-term, more broadly based and clinically
important beneﬁts, including larger effects on delusional convic-
tion, preoccupation and distress.
The next step is to move from this experimental work to the
therapeutic realm. We have developed a new therapy approach;
the ‘Thinking Well’ intervention. This is a brief therapy that builds
on the Maudsley Review Training Programme (MRTP) by
combining it with four subsequent reasoning-focussed CBT therapy
sessions. These are delivered by trained therapists, and are tailored
to the person's speciﬁc paranoid delusional beliefs, working to-
wards a selected personal goal that is difﬁcult to achieve because of
the delusions. As before, it is delivered individually, and suitable for
people with moderate to severe delusions.
The current study reports a feasibility randomised controlled
trial of the Thinking Well intervention. Its aims were to:
1. Test the feasibility and acceptability of the intervention;
2. Provide initial estimates of the effects of the intervention on
belief ﬂexibility and paranoia (distress, conviction and
preoccupation);
3. To undertake a preliminary examination of whether the therapy
sessions augment the effects of the MRTP alone.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
31 participants with persistent, stable persecutory delusions
were recruited from adult community mental health teams in three
large mental health Trusts in London, between October 2010 and
November 2011. The sample size of approximately 30 was chosen
apriori in order to assess feasibility and conduct preliminary sta-
tistical analyses. Power calculations were not conducted at this
pilot stage. Inclusion criteria were: a diagnosis of Schizophrenia
Spectrum Psychosis (ICD-10, F20-29); a current delusion with
persecutory content, assessed using SCAN (Wing et al., 1990), rated
as distressing (>0) on a visual analogue scale, and held with at least
50% conviction; aged 18e65 at study entry; and a sufﬁcient grasp of
English to complete measures and participate in the intervention.
Exclusion criteria were: a primary diagnosis of alcohol or drug
dependency; an organic syndrome; a learning disability; a major
psychotic relapse or crisis in the last three months. Participants had
all previously consented to take part in a previous research study,
the ‘Cognitive Mechanisms of Change in Delusions Study’. This
comprised two experimental studies: one involved completing the
MRTP or an attention-control condition (see Garety et al., 2014); the
other involved exposure to an anxiety provoking or control con-
dition with no therapeutic elements (Freeman et al., 2014). Of the
31 participants, six people had previously received the MRTP
intervention; thesewere all required tomeet the inclusion criterion
for the continued presence of high conviction distressing delusions.
Of the six, three were randomly allocated to the intervention group
and therefore completed the MRTP for a second time, and three
were allocated to the treatment as usual control.
A total of 37 potential participants were identiﬁed and invited to
participate, with the goal of reaching our recruitment target of 30,
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Of these, four did not meet the inclusion criteria above, two were
uncontactable and 31 consented. Three further participants with-
drew from the study following randomisation, but before
completion of baseline clinical assessments and before beginning
the intervention (see Fig. 1).
2.2. Design
The study was a pilot randomised controlled trial, which was an
amendment to a programme of studies (ISRCTN: 59501939; ethics
reference: 07/H0803/140; amendment for this study: June, 2010).
Participants were randomised by the study coordinator, using an
online tool (www.sealedenvelope.com), to either the ‘Thinking
Well’ intervention or treatment as usual (TAU). The study coordi-
nator was unblind to treatment allocation and informed partici-
pants of the outcome of the randomisation. Randomisation was at
the point of consent, using a 2:1 ratio of experimental to control
participants.
Study assessments were completed by research workers, who
were not blind to treatment group, at four time points: Time 1 (0
weeks; baseline assessment), Time 2 (1 week; post-MRTP), Time 3
(6 weeks, post-combined Thinking Well intervention) and Time 4
(8 weeks; two week follow-up).Fig. 1. Consort2.3. Interventions
2.3.1. Treatment as Usual (TAU)
Participants randomised to the TAU group continued to receive
their usual care in communitymental health services. This included
meetings with a care coordinator and less frequent meetings with a
psychiatrist, to discuss day to day management of their social,
physical and mental health needs. They did not receive any psy-
chological therapy focussed on their delusions for the period of the
study.
2.3.2. Thinking Well Intervention (TW)
Participants randomised to the intervention group met with a
Clinical Psychologist, expert in CBT with psychosis, to complete the
therapy. First, participants completed the Maudsley Review
Training Programme (MRTP) over either one or two sessions,
depending on participant preference. This was followed by four
individualised therapy sessions. The MRTP is described in detail
elsewhere (Waller et al., 2011), but, in short, it is a computerised
programme aiming to describe and normalise reasoning biases
(limited belief ﬂexibility and data gathering) and to teach people
how to identify and change these, through the use of ﬁve training
tasks. The tasks included learning to slow down and look for more
information, generating alternative, less upsetting explanations fordiagram.
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impact on thinking. All tasks were designed to be interactive and
engaging, and included simple puzzles, video recordings and short
ﬁlm clips. The focus in both training and homework exercises was
on exploring how people come to decisions andmake sense of their
everyday experiences. Participants complete the computer pro-
gramme together with the therapist, who discusses key points and
reﬂects on their comments. At the end of the programme, partici-
pants are shown how to use tailored thought records with ‘an
upsetting thought’, in order to consider whether there could be any
chance that they have formed an (over-rapid) view, which might be
mistaken. This aims to enhance the participant's belief ﬂexibility
and to recruit greater use of type two, reﬂective reasoning (Evans,
2008). Following completion of the MRTP, participants then met
with the therapist to complete 4 h-long, weekly CBT-based therapy
sessions. These sessions aimed to help participants apply the
learning from the MRTP to their own upsetting beliefs, in the
context of working towards a participant-chosen goal. For example,
one person wished to be able to get to the local shops more often,
which was hindered by a paranoid belief of being targeted by a
government agency.
All sessions began with a review of the past week and
completion of weekly ratings of reasoning and progress towards
their chosen goal. The therapist and participant also discussed any
reasoning biases they had noticed over the previous week,
including feedback from the therapist, in order to normalise this. In
the ﬁrst session, the therapist worked with the participant to
develop a basic formulation of the pattern of interpreting situations
and resulting thoughts, feelings and behaviours. They then intro-
duced the idea of stopping, slowing down and thinking through
whether there could be another way of looking at the situation,
using the learning and training tips from the MRTP. The homework
from the previous session was then discussed and any difﬁculties
were problem-solved. If the participant had not been able to
complete the homework, they were encouraged to complete a
thought record during the session, thinking through an ‘upsetting
situation’ from the previous week. Participants were gently
encouraged to think through all of the learning and strategies (tips)
from the MRTP in relation to the upsetting thought described. In
the case where they did not feel that the tips applied (where
conviction remained high and ﬂexibility low) there was an oppor-
tunity to discuss ways of feeling better e.g. pleasurable activities,
talking to a friend, distraction, relaxation. Personalised coping cards
were made for the participant to take away and use between ses-
sions. In the ﬁnal session, any changes in reactions, feelings and
behaviours were reviewed in relation to the participant's chosen
goal and main upsetting belief and the therapist talked through
relapse prevention strategies. They were given a copy of all hand-
outs to take away.
2.4. Measures
All measures were assessed at each of the four time points, with
the exceptions of the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symp-
toms (SAPS), used only at baseline, and participant feedback, which
was elicited from those in the intervention group at post-
intervention. The primary outcomes, where relevant, were all in
relation to participants' main, most strongly held, delusional belief.
2.4.1. Positive symptoms
The SAPS (Andreasen, 1984) is a semi-structured interview for
assessing positive symptoms in four areas: hallucinations, de-
lusions, bizarre behaviour and positive formal thought disorder.
The presence of symptoms in each area is rated from 0 (absent) to 5
(severe). Positive symptoms were assessed at baseline only toprovide a summary of clinical characteristics of the sample. The
scale has good psychometric properties (Andreasen, 1984).
2.4.2. Belief ﬂexibility
Belief ﬂexibility was assessed using two items previously
employed extensively in large scale studies (e.g. Garety et al., 2014;
So et al., 2012). The Explanations of Experiences Assessment
(Freeman et al., 2004) was used to assess the number of alternative
explanations for a person's experiences at each time point. Partic-
ipants were asked whether there was anything else that could
explain the evidence given for their delusional belief (‘Are there any
other reasonsdother than [state main belief] that could possibly ac-
count for these experiences even if you think they are very unlikely?’).
The number of distinct explanations given is recorded. One item
from the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS,
Wessely et al., 1993) was used to assess the participants' acceptance
of the possibility of being mistaken about their persecutory belief
by asking, after a full description of the belief and the grounds for it
had been elicited, ‘When you think about it now, is it at all possible
that you are mistaken about this?’ Responses to this question were
rated as a percentage (0e100% possibility of being mistaken).
2.4.3. State paranoia
A series of ﬁve visual analogue scales (VAS) items were used to
assess state paranoia taken from Green et al.'s (2008) Paranoid
Thought Scales (‘I am deliberately being harmed or upset’, ‘I am
being followed’, ‘there is a conspiracy against me’, ‘I am being
persecuted’, ‘I am being laughed at behind my back’). These items
were selected as having both high loadings on the persecution or
reference subscales, and also as representative of a range of key
paranoid concerns; they have good internal reliability (Cronbach's
alpha ¼ 0.86 (Freeman, Dunn, Fowler, et al., 2013; Freeman, Dunn,
Garety, et al., 2013). In response to each item, participants were
asked to rate, ‘how you have been feeling over the last 15 min’ in
response to each item, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (totally).
The mean of the ﬁve items is calculated at each time point to
provide a total paranoia score (Freeman, Dunn, Fowler, et al., 2013;
Freeman, Dunn, Garety, et al., 2013).
2.4.4. Delusional conviction
Conviction was rated using a visual analogue scale asking par-
ticipants to state how much they believe the main belief is true,
‘right now’, ranging from 0 (believe not at all) to 100% conviction
(believe absolutely).
2.4.5. Delusional distress and preoccupation
Participants were ask to rate how much, ‘right now’, their main
belief occupies their mind and upsets them, both on a 100 point
VAS scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (totally).
2.4.6. Participant feedback
At post-intervention participants in the intervention groupwere
asked to provide feedback on their experiences of the sessions,
using a semi-structured interview. Feedback was elicited on par-
ticipants' experiences of the MRTP training package and therapy
sessions, working with the therapist, how helpful and relevant the
sessions were for their problems and whether they learnt any new
skills to use in future. Ideas for improvement and on any unhelpful
aspects of the sessions were also sought.
2.5. Analysis
The acceptability and feasibility of the Thinking Well Interven-
tion was assessed through recruitment, drop-outs and feedback
Table 1
Clinical and demographic information: means (SD) and numbers of participants.
Total randomised
sample (n ¼ 31)
Thinking Well
group (n ¼ 20)
TAU group
(n ¼ 11)
Age (years) 41.11 (10.56) 39.05 (10.54) 43.00 (10.69)
Sex:
Male 22 (71%) 15 (75%) 7 (64%)
Female 9 (29%) 5 (25%) 4 (36%)
Ethnicity
White British/Irish 13 (41.9%) 7 (35%) 6 (54.5%)
Black Caribbean 8 (25.8%) 6 (30%) 2 (18.2)
Mixed Race 3 (9.7%) 2 (10%) 1 (9.1%)
Black African 3 (9.7%) 2 (10%) 1 (9.1%)
Black other 2 (6.5%) 2 (10%)
Asian 1 (3.2%) 0 (0%) 1 (9.1%)
Other ethnic group 1 (3.2%) 1 (5%)
Diagnosis
Schizophrenia 27 (87.1%) 16 (80%) 11 (100%)
Delusional Disorder 2 (6.5%) 2 (10%) 0 (0%)
Schizoaffective Disorder 2 (4.5%) 2 (10%) 0 (0%)
Length of illness (years) 12.66 (8.62) 10.49 (7.87) 14.91 (8.67)
Medication
Yes 28 (90.3%) 18 (90%) 10 (90.9%)
No 3 (9.7%) 2 (10%) 1 (9.1%)
Years of education 13.48 (2.71) 14.21 (2.82)
(n ¼ 19)
13.50 (3.06)
(n ¼ 10)
Marital Status
Single 25 (80.6%) 17 (85%) 8 (72.7%)
Previously married
or cohabiting
5 (16.1%) 2 (10%) 3 (27.3%)
Married 1 (3.2%) 1 (5%) 0 (0%)
Employment Status
Unemployed 28 (90.3%) 18 (90%) 11 (100%)
Employed 1 (3.2%) 2 (10%) 0 (0%)
Positive Symptoms:
SAPS ratings
(n ¼ 28) (n ¼ 18) (n ¼ 10)
Hallucinations 2.89 (1.66),
range ¼ 0-5
2.44 (1.58) 3.70 (1.57)
Delusions 4.07 (0.60),
range ¼ 3-5
4.17 (0.62) 3.90 (0.57)
Bizarre behaviour 0.57 (0.92),
range ¼ 0-3
0.56 (0.86) 0.60 (1.08)
Positive formal
thought disorder
0.86 (1.11),
range ¼ 0-4
1.06 (1.21) 0.50 (0.85)
Key: TAU ¼ Treatment as usual; SAPS ¼ Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (Andreasen,
1984).
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interviews are summarised descriptively.
To estimate intention-to-treat effects (i.e. differences between
the twogroups), a series of analyseswere conducted in STATA (v13.1,
StataCorp, 2013). The analysis used separate linear regression
models for outcome variables at times 2, 3 and 4, with a main effect
of treatment and adjusted for baseline values of the outcome mea-
sure. For the binary outcomes, we used exact logistic regression,
which is more appropriate for small samples and gives an exact p-
value. We report Cohen's D standardised effect sizes and their cor-
responding bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs), based on
unadjusted mean differences and the pooled standard deviation at
each timepoint. As recommended in guidelines for goodpractice for
the analysis of pilot studies (Lancaster, Dodd, &Williamson, 2004),
the focus of the results is on the estimates of the treatment effects
and the corresponding 95% CIs for the mean difference. Since the
study was not designed or powered for testing differences between
groups, the p values are reported for completeness but note that the
CIs of the treatment effect estimates are of greater relevance.
3. Results
A summary of clinical and demographic information for par-
ticipants in both groups is displayed in Table 1.Recruitment to the intervention was successful, and there were
few drop outs (3 out of 31). The two people whowithdrew from the
TW group did so after randomisation, but prior to starting the
intervention. The remaining 18 participants allocated to the inter-
vention group completed the entire intervention. The majority of
participants completed assessments at all time points, with the
exception of one person from the TAU group, who was uncon-
tactable at times three and four, and another participants from the
TW group who was uncontactable at time three only. No adverse
events were recorded for any participants during the study period.
3.1. Statistical analysis
Summary statistics for all outcomes across time points and
conditions are presented in Table 2. The main ITT analyses,
comprising separate linear regression models for outcome vari-
ables at times 2, 3 and 4, are presented in Table 3 . Inspection of the
effect sizes and conﬁdence intervals suggests that there were im-
provements in key outcome measures for those in the Thinking
Well group, relative to the TAU group. The regression coefﬁcients
(i.e. the treatment effects) and the standardised effect sizes
(Cohen's D) are generally numerically considerably higher in the
immediate post-Thinking Well assessments (time 3), than at the
post-MRTP (time 2) and follow-up assessment points (time 4)
(Table 3).
3.2. Participant feedback
Overall feedback was positive. Of the 17 respondents, approxi-
mately two thirds reported a positive experience with the TW
intervention, whilst one third reported a more neutral experience.
Speciﬁc examples and illustrative quotations of the feedback are
summarised in Table 4.
4. Discussion
The results of the study are promising, both in terms of the
feasibility and acceptability of the Thinking Well intervention, and
of the estimated treatment effects. Recruitment to the study ran
smoothly, and although two participants withdrew prior to starting
therapy, there were no drop outs following commencement of
therapy. Feedback from participants was typically positive, sug-
gesting that they had enjoyed the sessions, understood the content,
become more reﬂective and actively learnt new skills, which they
had then been able to apply outside the sessions and which had
improved their mood and wellbeing.
The a priori focus of these results is on the estimates of the
treatment effects and the corresponding 95% CIs for the mean
difference (Lancaster et al., 2004). The treatment effects immedi-
ately after the Thinking Well intervention favoured the interven-
tion condition, and were large. This suggests that at post-
intervention the addition of individual Thinking Well therapy ses-
sions may confer additional beneﬁts over MRTP alone. The size of
the MRTP effects are consistent with and comparable to those
found in our previous, larger (n ¼ 101) proof-of concept study (e.g.
standardised effect size (ES) for paranoia: Cohen's D ¼ 0.38 cf 0.36
in Garety et al., 2014); after the combined TW intervention in this
pilot study this rises to an effect size of 1.07. Additionally, clinically
beneﬁcial effects were seen not only for belief ﬂexibility and state
paranoia, but also on distress (after TW ES 1.3), and conviction (ES
0.6). From the perspective of the patient, these are important tar-
gets of the therapy, and carry the prospect of underpinning sus-
tained change; our previous briefer interventions did not achieve a
comparable change, especially in delusional conviction.
Table 2
Summary statistics at each time point for all outcome measures for each randomised group separately.
Measure Time ‘Thinking Well’ group ‘Treatment as usual’ group
Mean % SD Range N Mean SD Range N
Belief Flexibility: % participants with alternative explanations T1 22.2% e e 18 0.0% e e 10
T2 33.3% e e 18 20.0% e e 10
T3 47.1% e e 17 0.0% e e 9
T4 55.6% e e 18 11.1% e e 9
Belief ﬂexibility: Possibility of being mistaken % T1 22.61 27.57 0e75 18 22.22 23.20 0e50 9
T2 27.22 28.40 0e80 18 6.67 10.90 0e25 9
T3 27.19 31.14 0e100 16 1.25 3.54 0e10 8
T4 30.29 32.67 0e100 17 16.67 33.07 0e100 9
State paranoia T1 37.83 20.95 0e79 18 51.00 36.91 0e95 10
T2 44.17 24.25 0e100 18 52.60 17.38 27e79 10
T3 29.53 21.45 0e76 17 57.00 32.57 10e100 9
T4 38.39 28.60 0e98 18 52.89 19.21 25e80 9
Delusional conviction T1 78.61 23.31 25e100 18 84.44 26.63 25e100 9
T2 74.17 28.04 25e100 18 88.33 24.24 25e100 9
T3 55.00 36.36 0e100 17 76.11 33.15 0e100 9
T4 66.39 32.58 0e100 18 78.89 32.57 20e100 9
Delusional distress T1 63.89 25.98 20e100 18 81.11 24.21 25e100 9
T2 69.17 26.30 25e100 18 80.00 21.07 50e100 9
T3 44.82 32.06 0e100 17 83.57 23.22 40e100 7
T4 58.33 35.52 0e100 18 75.00 29.47 10e100 9
Delusional preoccupation T1 56.39 28.53 20e100 18 71.11 28.48 25e100 9
T2 58.33 26.35 0e100 18 73.33 19.84 50e100 9
T3 45.71 32.42 0e100 17 70.71 18.13 40e100 7
T4 51.78 33.03 0e100 18 68.89 32.19 15e100 9
Key: SD ¼ standard deviation.
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fully sustained at follow up: there were lower estimated effects at
follow-up in comparison to post-treatment, on all key outcomes
including belief ﬂexibility (post TW ES ¼ 1.0; follow-up ¼ 0.4),
state paranoia (post TW ¼ 1.1; follow-up ¼ 0.6) and delusional
conviction (post TW ¼ 0.6; follow-up ¼ 0.4). There were some
suggestions from the participant feedback data on ideas for
improvement (n¼ 4): that the sessions could be more personalised
and build in greater support to generalise the skills for use outside
the therapy sessions. We are currently extending the intervention
from 4 to 8 sessions, and integrating the MRTP and additional
Thinking Well sessions into a more intensive and sustained
approach to generalisation and homework, with enhanced digital
tools for self-management strategies.
Additionally, a small proportion of clients reported that they did
not ﬁnd the intervention (or indeed any type of therapy for some)
relevant to their problems. From this small pilot study we cannot
identify which patients will beneﬁt. Our previous proof-of-conceptTable 3
Effect of experimental group compared to control group on outcome measures at Times
Measure Time 2 (post MRTP) Time 3 (6 w
Effect (SE); 95% CI p-value Cohen's D;
95% CI
Effect (SE); 9
Belief Flexibility: Alternative
explanations
OR ¼ 1.47 (n/a),
1.00;
CI ¼ 0.09, 24.36
e e OR ¼ 0.17 (n
CI ¼ 0.00, 1.
Belief Flexibility: Probability
mistaken
20.35 (8.23);
3.35, 37.34
0.021 0.85;
1.47, 0.23
26.05 (10.61
State Paranoia 2.03 (7.28);
17.02, 12.96
0.782 0.38;
0.39, 1.16
13.96 (6.98
Delusional Conviction 9.90 (8.43);
27.31, 7.50
0.252 0.53;
0.41, 1.47
17.93 (13.5
46.00, 10.1
Delusional Distress 2.54 (9.44);
22.03, 16.95,
0.790 0.44;
0.31, 1.18
23.69 (12.8
50.50, 3.12
Delusional Preoccupation 9.82 (9.58);
29.59, 9.96
0.316 0.61;
0.11, 1.34
20.64 (13.4
48.65, 7.38
Key: SE ¼ standard error; OR ¼ odds ratio; CI ¼ conﬁdence interval.experiment suggested that working memory and negative symp-
toms moderated effects of the intervention on reasoning (Garety
et al., 2014). We also know that beliefs about the causes and
treatability of one's problems and the relevance of psychological
treatment may affect engagement, and consequently outcome
(Freeman, Dunn, Garety, et al., 2013; Marcus et al., 2014). An
important goal of future research is to clarify the reasons for
treatment engagement and treatment effect heterogeneity. Build-
ing on our earlier research, we plan in future to examine whether
characteristics of the participants (including working memory and
negative symptoms) moderate the effects of the intervention on
reasoning and also whether beliefs about their problems affects
receipt of an adequate dose of treatment-as-intended.
The current pilot research design had limitations, including the
lack of blinding of research workers to treatment condition and the
opportunistic recruitment procedure, identifying eligible partici-
pants from those who had already taken part in a previous study.
Six participants had already received the MRTP package, three of2, 3 and 4.
eeks/post thinking Well) Time 4 (8 week follow-up)
5% CI p-value Cohen's D;
95% CI
Effect (SE); 95% CI p-value Cohen's D;
95% CI
/a), 0.119;
50
e e OR ¼ 0.18 (n/a),
0.249
e e
); 3.98, 48.12 0.023 1.01;
1.59, 0.42
12.23 (9.82);
8.09, 32.54
0.226 0.42;
1.34, 0.51
); 28.93, 0.48 0.057 1.07;
0.07, 2.20
5.54 (9.91);
26.00, 14.92
0.581 0.56;
0.34, 1.45
7);
4
0.199 0.60;
0.31, 1.51
8.98 (12.19);
34.13, 16.17
0.468 0.38;
0.55, 1.32
9);
,
0.080 1.30;
0.33, 2.26
7.94 (13.67);
36.16, 20.28
0.567 0.49;
0.31, 1.30
7);
,
0.140 0.86;
0.07, 1.64
17.47 (13.54);
40.42, 15.48
0.366 0.52;
0.39, 1.44
Table 4
Participant feedback: descriptions and illustrative quotations.
Positive views (n ¼ 11)
General: ‘Lovely, really enjoyed it’
‘Excellent, very worth doing’
‘Enlightening’
Learning new skills: ‘I learnt my mood can affect my thinking’
‘[I learnt] how to weigh up conclusions’
‘I learnt a different way of thinking: don't JTC; feel strong and conﬁdent’;
‘I learnt connections to behaviours and beliefs and mental health - touched me deeply’
Application of new skills: ‘Now I look at the evidence e a lot of it was paranoia; the way I process my thoughts’
‘I think about the reasons why the police may not be following me e I look at things objectively
‘I try not to JTC: I assess my mood’
‘It gave me another perspective; not look at things as they appear, but look from a different angle.’
Relationship with the therapist: ‘They showed concern toward me’
‘The way the therapist explained things e it was a good chat’
Impact on mood and conﬁdence: ‘I feel a lot stronger e I was feeling dreadful before’
‘Thinking differently makes me feel better’
‘Made me more motivated eit's going to be okay’
‘More relaxed and not so prone to getting tense when I am outdoors’
Neutral or negative views (n ¼ 6)
General: ‘It was okay, but a bit boring’
‘Same as before with [previous psychologist] but more paperwork’
Not relevant to personal problems: ‘No, it's not what the doctor prescribes'
‘Not really [relevant]; some of the questions did not really apply to me’
‘The whole JTC thing is not relevant to me. I don't think I JTC’
‘It is not giving any remedy’
Belief that therapy cannot help: ‘[I don't think] anything can help’
‘Wasn't really that helpful; can't feel good without alcohol’
Ideas for improvements (n ¼ 4)
Personalising Sessions: ‘The videos are a bit too vague; not very concise and relevant
Couldn't apply everything to my situation e ok here but if I was at home would be different’
‘Make more personalised and focus on aspects of distress’
‘Tailor more issues’
Length of Sessions: ‘[Sessions could be] shorter e 45 min’
‘Longer sessions or more of them’
H. Waller et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 48 (2015) 82e8988whom were allocated to the intervention group and therefore
completed the package on two occasions, while three were allo-
cated to the control group. It is unclear what impact this would
have had on the results, although going through the package twice
may have acted as a booster and might have led to greater im-
provements. However, all participants were screened before entry
and continued meet inclusion criteria, so that all of the current
sample had persistent, treatment-resistant delusional beliefs at
baseline. We note that there were chance baseline differences in
delusions variables between the two groups, and that if these
variables are prognostic of outcome, future larger studies should
stratify randomisation by these variables.
Overall, we conclude that following modiﬁcations aimed at
improving the generalizability, maintenance of effects and real-life
application of the therapy, the current ﬁndings hold promise and
justify proceeding to a fully powered RCT.Funding
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